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Abstract 
Children learn their native language by exposure to their linguistic and communicative 
environment, but apparently without requiring that their mistakes are corrected. Such learning 
from “positive evidence” has been viewed as raising “logical” problems for language 
acquisition. In particular, without correction, how is the child to recover from conjecturing an 
over-general grammar, which will be consistent with any sentence that the child hears? There 
have been many proposals concerning how this “logical problem” can be dissolved. Here, we 
review recent formal results showing that the learner has sufficient data to learn successfully 
from positive evidence, if it favours the simplest encoding of the linguistic input. Results 
include the learnability of linguistic prediction, grammaticality judgments, language 
production, and form-meaning mappings. The simplicity approach can also be “scaled-down” 
to analyse the learnability of specific linguistic constructions, and is amenable to empirical test 
as a framework for describing human language acquisition.  
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Children appear to learn language primarily by exposure to the language of others. But how is 
this possible? The computational challenges of inferring the structure of language from mere 
exposure are formidable. In light of this, many theorists have conjectured that language 
acquisition is only possible because the child possesses cognitive machinery that fits especially 
closely with the structure of natural language. This could be because the brain has adapted to 
language (Pinker & Bloom, 1990), or because language has been shaped by the brain 
Christiansen & Chater, 2007). 
 A number of informal arguments concerning the challenge of language learning from 
experience have been influential. Chomsky (1980) argued that the “poverty of the stimulus” 
available to the child was sufficiently great that the acquisition of language should be viewed 
as analogous to the growth of an organ, such as the lung or the heart, unfolding along channels 
pre-specified in the genome. Here, we focus on a specific facet of poverty of the stimulus: that 
children do not appear to receive or attend to “negative evidence:" explicit feedback that 
certain utterances are ungrammatical (Bowerman, 1988; Brown & Hanlon, 1970; Marcus, 
1993).
1
  
The ability to learn language in the absence of negative evidence is especially puzzling, 
given that linguistic rules are riddled with apparently capricious restrictions. For example, a 
child might naturally conclude from experience that there is a general rule that is can be 
contracted, as in He’s taller than she is. But contractions are not always allowed, for example: 
*He is taller than she’s. The puzzle is that, once the learner has entertained the possibility that 
the overgeneral rule is correct, it appears to have no way to “recover” from overgeneralization 
and recognise that restrictions should be added. This is because each contraction that it hears 
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conforms to the overgeneral rule. Now, if the learner uses the overgeneral rule to generate 
language, then it will from time to time produce utterances such as *John isn't coming but 
Mary’s. A listener’s startled reaction or look of incomprehension might provide a crucial clue 
that the rule is overgeneral. However, such feedback is the very negative evidence that appears 
to be inessential to child language acquisition. Thus, if children do not require such negative 
evidence, how can they recover from such overgeneralisations? Various scholars argue that 
they cannot: Restrictions on overgeneral grammatical rules must, instead, be innately specified 
(e.g., Crain & Lillo-Martin, 1999). Other theorists argue that avoiding overgeneral rules poses 
a fundamental “logical problem” for language acquisition (Baker & McCarthy, 1981; Dresher 
& Hornstein, 1976). 
One way to defuse the puzzle is to challenge its premise. One possibility is that, despite 
appearances, children can access and use negative evidence in a subtle form. In this paper, we 
set aside these contentious issues (e.g., Demetras, Post & Snow, 1986; Marcus, 1993) and 
argue that, whether or not negative evidence is available to, or used by, the child, language can 
successfully be learned without it (following, for example, MacWhinney,  1993; 2004; Rohde 
& Plaut,  1999; Tomasello,  2004).  
The arguments for learnability from positive evidence presented here are part of a 
broader tradition of research on learnability (e.g., Angluin, 1980, 1988; Clark, & Eyraud, 2007; 
Feldman, 1972; Gold, 1967; Horning, 1969; Jain, Osherson, Royer & Kumar Sharma, 1999; 
Niyogi, 2006; Wharton, 1974). And formal learnability arguments are complementary to recent 
developments of language engineering systems, which have shown that it is possible to learn 
automatically non-trivial aspects of phonology, morphology, syntax and semantics from 
positive language input (Goldsmith, 2001; Klein & Manning, 2005; Steyvers, Griffiths & 
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Tenenbaum, 2006). While such systems are still very far from being able to acquire language 
from mere exposure, the pace of progress suggests that a priori barriers to learning may not 
necessarily be insurmountable.  
 Rather than surveying these developments, and indicating how they may be extended, 
here we will take a more direct approach: we focus on one major line of positive learnability 
results based on the ‘simplicity principle’. We begin by introducing the simplicity principle 
(Section 1) and considering how it can be embodied in an “ideal learner” (Section 2). We then 
outline some recent formal results on how the simplicity principle can be used to learn aspects 
of language such as utterance prediction, grammaticality judgments, language production, and 
mapping between form and meaning (Sections 3-6). We then briefly describe a practical 
method for assessing learnability of linguistic patterns using the simplicity approach, and how 
this assessment can be linked with experimental data (Section 7). Overall, the contribution of 
the work reviewed here is to show that, under fairly mild conditions, language acquisition from 
sufficient amounts of positive evidence is possible; and to indicate how the simplicity-based 
approach can potentially provide a framework for understanding child language acquisition. 
 
1. Ideal learning using a simplicity principle 
The simplicity principle has a long history in the philosophy of science and the study of 
perception (e.g., Mach, 1959/1886), and has been proposed as a general cognitive principle 
(Chater & Vitányi, 2002). A formal analysis of simplicity learning starts with supposing a 
learner (human or artificial) that is faced with a set of positive data. For language, this data is a 
set of observed grammatical sentences.
2
 Any set of observed sentences will be consistent with 
an infinite number of grammars. That is, any set of sentences could have been generated by any 
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of an infinite number of grammars. How can the learner choose among these infinite 
possibilities?  
The simplicity principle recommends that the learner prefers hypotheses which allows 
for the simplest encoding of the data. For language, the data will be the observed sentences, and 
hypotheses are grammars (or other linguistic representations), which can be viewed as a set of 
probabilistic rules which captures the patterns in the linguistic input to the learner. Simplicity 
can be measured by viewing hypotheses (here, grammars) as computer programs which encode 
the data (the data is generated as the output of the program). The simplicity principle thus 
favors the grammar that provides the shortest encoding of the data.
3
  
How can a grammar be viewed as a computer program for encoding linguistic input? 
One concrete approach involve two steps. The first step is to specifying the grammatical rules 
(and, crucially, probabilities of their use). This defines a probabilistic process for generating 
sentences; and thus defines a probability distribution over possible strings. The second step is 
to encode the specific sentences in the input. It is intuitively clear that the most efficient way to 
do this is to reserve shorter codes for probable strings; and longer codes for less probable 
strings. A basic result from information theory (e.g., Cover & Thomas, 2006) is that the 
optimal way to do this is to assign a binary code of length log21/p to a string with probability 
p.
4
 So, intuitively, a (probabilistic) grammar provides a short encoding of the linguistic input if 
it can itself be specified briefly; and if it makes the sentences that are actually observed as 
probable as possible. There is a tension between these objectives. An “over-precise” grammar, 
which encodes exactly those sentences that have been encountered and no others will make 
those particular sentences highly probably; but the code for such a grammar will be long 
(roughly, it will consist just of a list of the “allowed” sentences). Conversely, a very simple but 
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overgeneral grammar (e.g., stating, roughly, that words can occur in any order with equal 
probability) will have a short code, but, because the space of possible allowed sentences is vast, 
the code for the specific sentences observed by the learner will be very long. The simplicity 
principle recommends finding an balance between these extremes: postulating restrictions in 
the grammar just when these “pay off” by sufficiently reducing the code length of the 
sentences, encoded by the grammar.  
 As we have indicated, in general, the better the grammar captures the structure of the 
language, the shorter the encoded representation of the linguistic input will be. For a concrete 
example, let us first consider hypotheses (i.e. grammars) describing artificially simplistic 
language data. Suppose the observed language was the following repeating infinite string of 
sentences: Hi! Bye! Hi! Bye!… One hypothesis could be “The language is a sequence of ‘Hi!’ 
and ‘Bye!’ occurring independently, and each with .5 probability.” Under this hypothesized 
grammar, the encoded specification of the language input will be “0101…”, where 0 and 1 
correspond to ‘Hi!’ and ‘Bye!’ respectively. Now if the hypothesis was a more powerfully 
descriptive grammar such as “The language contains a single sentence ‘Hi! Bye!’, then no 
further code at all is required to specify the linguistic input. Now, an infinite language input is 
fully specified in a simple finite description—and, more generally, the more precisely the 
grammar captures the structure of the linguistic input, the shorter the encoding of that linguistic 
input will be.  
Initially, the learner may not have sufficient data to favour the latter hypothesis; but 
eventually the latter “grammar” will provide the simpler encoding, because it correctly captures 
regularities in the input. Hence, as linguistic input accumulates, the grammar which provides 
the simplest encoding will be updated. An ideal simplicity learner (as in the mathematical 
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results below) will have access to all (infinite) possibly hypothetical grammars that describe its 
current language data input, and choose the “simplest;’ any real, and hence computationally 
limited, learner can of course only approximate this calculation to some degree.  
Crucially, note that the simplicity-based learner has a mechanism for avoiding 
overgeneral grammars, when learning from positive evidence. Although our artificial data is 
compatible with a random sequence of ‘Hi!’ and ‘Bye!,’ the corresponding grammar is 
eliminated without the need for negative evidence, but because another grammar provides a 
shorter encoding of the input.
5
 
This point applies equally to learning natural languages. Consider the case of is 
contraction mentioned above. Consider two possible grammars, one that allows is contraction 
everywhere, and one that is more restricted (allowing He’s taller than she is but not *He is 
taller than she’s). The latter “grammar” will be more complex (because it involves specifying 
more precisely when contraction can occur); but it will encode the linguistic input more briefly, 
because it more accurately captures the structure of the language. Given sufficient linguistic 
input, the benefit of the more accurate encoding of the linguistic input will overwhelm any 
additional costs in encoding the grammatical rule, and the more precise rule will be favoured. 
Thus, it appears that an overgeneral grammar can be eliminated by applying the simplicity 
principle to positive data only.  
This intuition is encouraging but hardly definitive. Knowing that a learner can 
potentially eliminate a single over-general grammar does not, of course, indicate that it can 
successfully choose between an infinity of possible grammars, and home in on the “true” 
grammar, or some approximation to it. We shall see, however, that positive mathematical 
results along these lines are possible. Moreover, in Section 7, we shall apply the style of 
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argument sketched above to the learnability of some specific, and much-discussed, linguistic 
regularities (see Hsu, Chater & Vitányi, 2011).  
 
2 An“ideal” learner 
Below, we consider some formal theoretical results describing what an “ideal” learner can 
learn purely from exposure to an (indefinitely long) sequence of linguistic input (i.e., positive 
evidence) by using the simplicity principle. 
 What is the structure of the linguistic material to be learned? Fortunately, it turns out 
that we need assume only that this input is generated probabilistically by some computable 
process.
6
 This restriction is mild because cognitive science takes computability constraints on 
mental processes, including the generation of language, as founding assumptions (Pylyshyn, 
1984) and, indeed, specific models of language structure and generation all adhere to this 
assumption. Finally, for mathematical convenience, and without loss of generality, we assume 
that the linguistic input is coded in binary form. 
 Importantly, note that these assumptions allow that there can be any (computable) 
relationship between different parts of the input---we do not, for example, assume that 
sentences are independently sampled from a specific probability distribution. Our very mild 
assumption allows sentences to be highly interdependent (this is one generalization with 
respect to earlier results, e.g., Angluin, 1980; Jerome Feldman, 1972; Wharton, 1974), and 
includes the possibility that the language may be modified or switched during the input or 
indeed that sentences from many different languages might be interleaved.  
 Specifically, suppose that the linguistic input, coded as a binary sequence, x, is 
generated by a computable probability distribution, C(x).
7
 Intuitively, we can view this as 
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meaning that there is a computer program, C, (which might, for example, encode a grammar, as 
above) which receives random input y, from a stream of coin flips. When fed to C, this random 
input generates x as output, i.e., C(y) = x. The probability of this y is 2
-l(y)
 (the probability of 
generating any specific binary sequence of length l(y) from unbiased coin flips). Many y may 
generate the same x, so the probability of an output with initial segment x, C(x), is the sum of 
the probabilities of such y:  
 


...)(:
)(2)(
xyCy
yl
C x
       (1) 
The distribution C(x) is built on a simplicity principle: outputs which correspond to short 
programs for the computer program, C, are overwhelmingly more probable than outputs for 
which there are no short programs.  
 The learner’s task, then, can be viewed as approximating C(x), given a sample x, 
generated from the computer program, C. So, for example, if C generated independent samples 
from a specific stochastic phrase structure grammar, then the learner’s aim is to find a 
probability distribution which matches the probabilities generated by that stochastic grammar 
as accurately as possible. To the extent that this is possible, we might conjecture that the 
learner should (i) be able to predict how the corpus will continue; (ii) decide which strings are 
allowed by C(x); and (iii) generate output similar to that generated by C(x). Framing these 
points in terms of language acquisition, this means that, by approximating C(x), the learner 
can, to some approximation, (i) predict what phoneme, word, or sentence will come next 
(insofar as this is predictable at all); (ii) learn to judge grammaticality; and (iii) learn to 
produce language, indistinguishable from that to which it has been exposed. We explore these 
issues in turn in Sections 3-5.   
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How, then, can the learner approximate C(x), given that it has exposure to just one 
(admittedly arbitrarily long) corpus x, and no prior knowledge of the specific computational 
process, C, which has generated this corpus? It turns out that we can make progress by 
assuming only that the learner can, in principle, entertain all and only computable 
hypotheses—i.e., that the learner’s  representational resources are universal: i.e., sufficient to 
encode any possible computation. Elementary results in computability theory (e.g., Odifreddi, 
1988) have shown that this assumption of universality is surprisingly mild, and is satisfied by 
very simple abstract languages (such as the lambda calculus, Barendregt, 1984) and familiar 
practical languages from Fortran, to C++, to Java and Scheme. We assume, then, that the brain 
(and our ideal learner) has at least these representational resources.  
We have stated that a simplicity-based learner favor simple “explanations,” measured in 
terms of code length in some programming language. But surely the length of a program 
depends on the programming language used? What may be easy to write in Matlab may be 
difficult to write in Prolog; and vice versa. It turns out, though, that the choice of programming 
language affects program lengths only to a limited degree. An important result, known as the 
invariance theorem  (Li & Vitányi, 1997), states that, for any two universal programming 
languages, the length of the shortest program for any computable object in each language is 
bounded by a fixed constant. A caveat is appropriate, however: “invariance” up to an additive 
constant is sufficient for establishing mathematical results, such as those below; but choice of 
representation language is crucial for making learning practically feasible, as we shall note in 
Section 7.
8
 Nonetheless, so long as we assume that the learner’s coding language is universal, 
we can avoid having to provide a specific account of the program that the learner uses.
9
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Now suppose the learner assumes only that the corpus, x, is generated by a computable 
process (and hence makes no assumptions that it is generated by a specific type of grammar, or 
indeed, any grammar at all; makes no assumption that “sentences” are sampled independently, 
etc.). Then the probability of each possible x is given by the probability that this sequence will 
be generating from the output of a random input, y, of length l(y) (as before, by random coin 
flips) fed to a universal computer, U.
10
 Analogous to (1), we can define this “universal 
monotone distribution” (Solomonoff, 1978) (x): 
 


xyUy
ylx
...)(:
)(2)(  (2) 
where U(y) are programs y written in the universal programming language. Thus, an ideal 
learner draws on its universal programming language and the simplicity principle to formulate 
(x). Remarkably, it turns out that (x) serves as a good enough approximation to C(x) to 
allow the ideal learner to predict future linguistic input; and we show below that this allows the 
ideal learner to make grammaticality judgments, produce grammatical utterances, and map 
sound to meaning.  
 What is the mysterious (x) in more concrete terms? Roughly, it is what would result 
from randomly typing into a computer; feeding the resulting “programs” (most of which will, 
of course, not even be syntactically valid, or will loop indefinitely) to the interpreter for some 
universal programming language (say, C++); and considering the outputs of the (small number 
of) valid and terminating programs. Thus, we can alter the familiar image of monkeys 
randomly hitting the keys on a typewriter and, supposedly, eventually generating the works of 
Shakespeare, to the image of monkeys typing computer programs, and generating outputs x 
according to (x). The probability (x) will depend, of course, on the length of the shortest 
Simplicity-based approach to language learning  13 
program generating x, as short programs are overwhelmingly more likely to be chanced upon 
by the monkey.  
 We shall explore the remarkable properties of (x) shortly. But it is worth noting at the 
outset that (x) is known to be uncomputable (Li & Vitányi, 1997), and hence must be 
approximated. It remains an open question how closely (x) can be approximated and how this 
affects learnability results.  Promisingly, computable approximations to the universal 
distribution can be developed into practical tools in statistics and machine learning (e.g., 
Rissanen, 1987; Wallace & Freeman, 1987). Related approximations will be considered briefly 
in Section 7 in relation to developing a methodology for assessing the learnability of specific 
linguistic patterns.  
 
3. Prediction 
One indication of the degree to which a learner understands the patterns in the data in any 
domain, is its ability to predict. Thus, if the linguistic input is governed by grammatical or 
other principles of whatever complexity, any learner that can predict how the linguistic 
material will continue, arbitrarily well, must, in some sense, have learned such regularities. 
Prediction has been used as a measure of how far the structure of a language has been learned 
since Shannon (1951); and is widely used as a measure of learning in connectionist models of 
language processing (Christiansen & Chater, 1994, 1999; Elman, 1990) . And, as we have 
noted, this result for prediction will be a foundation for results concerning grammaticality 
judgments, language production, and form-meaning mapping, as we discuss in subsequent 
sections.  
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We formulate the task of prediction as follows. At each point in a binary sequence x (encoding 
our linguistic input), generated by computer C, the probabilities that, given input x, that the 
next symbol is 0 or 1 can be written: 
 
)(
)0(
)|0(
x
x
x
C
C
C


   ;   
)(
)1(
)|1(
x
x
x
C
C
C


      (3) 
 
where 
)|0( xC  
and 
)|1( xC
represent the probabilities that the subsequence x is followed by 
a 0 and 1 respectively; and )0(xC  and )1(xC  are the probabilities the specific sequence of  x 
followed by 0 or 1, respectively.  But the ideal learner does not have access to C(x), but 
instead uses (x) for prediction. Thus, the learner’s predictions for the next item of a binary 
sequence that has started with x is: 
 
 
)(
)0(
)|0(
x
x
x


  ;  
)(
)1(
)|1(
x
x
x


      (4) 
 
A key result by Solomonoff (1978), which we call the Prediction Theorem, shows that, in a 
specific rigorous sense, the universal monotone distribution , described above, is reliable for 
predicting any computable monotone distribution, , with very little expected error. More 
specifically, the difference in these predictions is measured by the square of difference in the 
probabilities that  and  assign to 0 being the next symbol: 
 
 2)|0()|0()(Error xxx  
     (5) 
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And the expected sum-squared error for the nth item in the sequence is:  
 
 sn  (x)Error
x:l (x )n 1
 (x)      (6) 
 
The better  predicts , the smaller sn will be. Given this, the overall expected predictive 
success of the method across the entire sequence is obtained by summing the sn across all n:  
  


1=n
ns           (7) 
Solomonoff’s Prediction Theorem shows that predictions using  approximate any computable 
distribution, , so that 

1=n
ns  is bounded by a constant. Thus, as the amount of data increases, 
the expected prediction error goes to 0.  Specifically, the following result holds:  
   
Prediction Theorem (Solomonoff, 1978): Let  be a computable monotone distribution, 
predicted by a universal distribution . Then,  
 )(
2
2log
1
Ks e
n
n 


       (8) 
where K() is the length of the shortest program on the universal machine that implements , 
known as its Kolmogorov complexity  (see Li & Vitányi, 1997, for further details, and an 
accessible proof). 
The Prediction Theorem shows that learning by simplicity can, in principle, be expected 
to converge to the correct conditional probabilities for predicting subsequent linguistic 
material. This implies that the learner is able to learn the structure of the language---because if 
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not, the learner will not know which sentences are likely to be said, and hence will make 
prediction errors. This results suggest that, given sufficient positive evidence, linguistic 
restrictions, such as those on the allowed contraction of is mentioned above, are learnable from 
positive evidence. Here “sufficient” means enough language input has been observed such that 
the (more complex) grammar which contains the restriction provides the simplest overall 
coding of the data, because it provides an efficient specification of that input. The learner 
which does not learn these restrictions will continue to predict the ungrammatical form when it 
is not allowed, and thus accrue an infinite number of prediction errors. Note that while the 
Prediction Theorem demonstrates that an ideal learner, with sufficient positive evidence, will 
learn to respect these linguistic restrictions, there is no claim that the learner can recover 
grammar that generated the language---but the learner’s predictions will capture the structure 
of the language arbitrarily closely.  
 
4. Learning grammatical judgments 
One of the distinctive shifts from Bloomfield’s (1933) version of structural linguistics to 
Chomsky’s (1957) generative grammar concerns methodology: while Bloomfield considered 
the goal of linguistics to be inducing patterns in language from corpora of utterances, Chomsky 
rejected this approach, and stressed instead capturing native speaker intuitions about, for 
example, the grammaticality of sentences. Our discussion of prediction, based on the linguistic 
input to the learner, seems closely allied to Bloomfield’s perspective. But Chomsky’s approach 
presents a fresh challenge: human language learners appear not just to learn to predict, based 
on the structure of what they hear---instead, people appear to be able learn to be able to 
distinguish grammatical from ungrammatical sentences from positive evidence alone. This 
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raises the question: under what conditions are grammaticality judgements learnable from 
positive data? 
It turns out that the task of prediction naturally extends surprisingly naturally to that of 
grammaticality judgments. The crucial move is to consider predictions for larger units 
linguistic material (e.g., words, rather than binary codes) and ask how often the predicted 
utterance will correspond to a continuation that is a grammatical sentence. The crucial question 
is how far the learner’s predictions fit with the set of options that are grammatically possible in 
the language. Specifically, we can ask: How often does the learner overgeneralize such that its 
guesses violate the rules of the language (e.g., predicting a contraction of is where it is not 
allowed)? And, conversely, how often does the learner undergeneralize what is possible, such 
that it fails to guess continuations that are acceptable (e.g., not predicting a contraction when it 
is allowed)? Results for overgeneralization and undergeneralization errors are examined in 
turn.  
 
4.1 Grammaticality errors: overgeneralization 
When considering grammaticality, it is, as we have noted, convenient to consider language 
input as a sequence of words, rather than coded as a binary form. Thus, instead of dealing with 
distributions, , , over binary sequences, one may consider distributions P and P.over 
sequences of a finite vocabulary of words. Suppose that the learner has seen a corpus, x, of j-1 
words and has a probability j(x) of incorrectly guessing a jth word which happens to be 
ungrammatical, i.e., the string cannot be completed to produce a grammatical sentence. One 
can write:  
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 j (x)  P(k | x)
k : xk is un grammatical,
l (x ) j1
       (9) 
As before, we focus on the expected value  j :  
 j  P(x)
x:l (x) j1
  j(x)       (10) 
This expected value captures the probability that the learner’s prediction concerning the jth 
word will not actually be allowable in the language—that the learner overgeneralizes what the 
language contains. But such overgeneralizations are, of course, a failure of prediction---and we 
know, from the Prediction Theorem above, that errors in the learner’s predictions are gradually 
eliminated. So the Prediction Theorem can be used to provide a ‘bound’ on the number of 
overgeneralization errors that the learner will generated. Specifically, it is possible to derive the 
following ‘overgeneralization theorem’ (Chater & Vitányi, 2007): 
  j
j1

 
K()
loge2
       (11) 
That is, the total expected amount of probability devoted by the learner to overgeneralizations, 
in the course of encountering an infinite corpus, sums to a finite quantity; and this quantity is 
close to the length of the shortest program that generates the linguistic data. Thus, the expected 
amount of overgeneralization must tend to zero, as more of the corpus has been encountered; 
and the number of errors will depend on the complexity of the language to be learned (where 
complexity is measured in terms of program length). 
 The ability to deal with overgeneralization of the grammar from linguistic experience is 
particularly relevant to previous discussions of the “logical problem” of language learnability, 
discussed above (Baker & McCarthy, 1981; Hornstein & Lightfoot, 1981; Pinker, 1979; 
Pinker, 1984). The learner only hears a finite corpus of sentences. Assuming the language is 
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infinite, a successful learner must therefore infer the acceptability of an infinite number of 
sentences that it has never heard. Thus, not hearing a sentence cannot be evidence against its 
existence. As noted above, this has raised the puzzle of whether it is possible for overly general 
grammars ever to be eliminated by the learner. The overgeneralization theorem shows that an 
ideal learner using the simplicity principle will eliminate overly general grammars, given a 
sufficiently large corpus.  
  
4.2 Grammaticality errors: undergeneralization 
The universal distribution used by the ideal learner was defined as being a combination of all 
possible (computable) distributions over corpora,  and thus all grammatical sentence in the 
language will always be deemed possible (assigned non-zero probability).  This immediately 
implies that an ideal learner will never strictly undergeneralize, i.e., incorrectly deem a 
grammatical utterance to have probability 0. But perhaps an ideal learner could drastically 
underestimate a sentence’s probability of occurrence.  One can investigate the extent to which 
an ideal learner might commit such errors of ‘soft’ undergeneralization, putting an upper bound 
on the number of soft undergeneralizations an ideal learner will make. Suppose that the learner 
underestimates, by a factor of at least f, the probability that word k will occur after linguistic 
material x. That is, P(k|x) f P(k|x). Let j,f(x) denote the probability that the word that is the 
true continuation will be one of the k for which this underestimation occurs:  

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Then, the following undergeneralization theorem holds, which bounds the expected number of 
undergeneralization errors throughout the corpus, i.e., 

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so long as f > e, where e is the mathematical constant 2.71... 
Thus the expected number of ‘soft’ undergeneralizations is bounded, even for an 
infinitely long sequence of linguistic input and the expected rate at which such errors occur 
converges to zero. As with overgeneralizations, the upper bound is proportional to K(),  the 
complexity of the underlying computational mechanism generating the language (including, 
presumably, the grammar). The higher the underestimation factor f to be, the fewer such 
undergeneralizations occur.  
 In summary, formal results have shown that an ideal learner, using the universal 
probability distribution, P, and derived from the simplicity principle, can learn to make 
accurate grammaticality judgments that avoid both overgeneralizations and 
undergeneralizations---an issue that, as noted above, has been viewed as of fundamental 
importance in recent linguistic theorizing. In the description above, grammaticality judgments 
have been framed as the process of guessing which word comes next. However, it is important 
to note that these results extend to all other units of linguistic analysis, e.g., prediction of 
utterances on the level phonemes, syllables, or sentences.  
 
5. Learning to Produce Language 
One method of describing language production is to assume that it is simply a matter of 
predicting future utterances of arbitrarily long lengths. Thus, a learner, given an entire history 
Simplicity-based approach to language learning  21 
of linguistic input, can eventually “join in” and starts saying its predictions.  Production 
success can be assessed by how well these productions blend in with the linguistic input --i.e., 
how well the learner’s productions match those that other speakers of the language (i.e., those 
producing the learner’s corpus) might equally well have said. This is, of course, a highly 
limited linguistic goal, given that a key purpose of language is to express one’s own thoughts, 
which may be diverge from what others have said before. (We will consider how this limitation 
can partially be dealt with in the next section.) However, as a first step, one can begin to assess 
a learner’s ability to speak a language by assessing whether the learner can blend into the on-
going “conversation.” 
Blending in can be described as the ability to match the actual probability that a new 
sequence of utterances, y, will follow the previous utterances, x, which have been heard so far 
in the conversation.   This is the probability (y|x), which reflects the distribution of continued 
sequences that would be uttered by speakers of the language. As before, the learner’s stream of 
utterances can be defined on any linguistic level, e.g., phonemes, words or sentences. Because 
the ideal learner generates utterances using the distribution it learned in prediction, , the 
learner will predict continuations according to (y|x). The learner will blend in, to the extent 
that (y|x) is a good approximation to (y|x)--i.e., the extent to which the learner has a 
propensity to produce language that other speakers have a propensity to produce.  Note, 
though, that the objective is now not merely predicting the next binary code, piecemeal; the 
material to be predicted, y, can be an arbitrarily large chunk of linguistic material (e.g., an 
entire clause or sentence).  
 It turns out  that (y|x) is a good approximation to any relevant (y|x) (Li & Vitányi, 
1997;  this result does not follow directly from the Prediction Theorem): If  is, as above, a 
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probability distribution associated with a monotone computable process, and  denotes the 
universal distribution, then for any finite sequence y, as the length of sequence x tends to 
infinity: 
 1
)|(
)|(

xy
xy


        (15) 
with a probability tending to 1, for fixed utterance y and growing prior linguistic experience x. 
Thus, viewing (15) in the context of language production, this means that, in the asymptote, the 
learner will blend in arbitrarily well, so that its language productions are indistinguishable from 
those of the language community to which it has been exposed.  
 
6. Learning to map linguistic forms to semantic representations 
In addition to being able to predict, make grammatical judgments, and produce linguistic 
regularities, language acquisition also involves associating linguistic forms with meanings.  
Indeed, to the ability to judge grammaticality, or produce language indistinguishable from that 
of one’s speech community, would be pointless unless it were associated with the ability to 
communicate: to map from utterances to some representation of their interpretations, and back 
(we remain neutral here about nature of these representations).  
A common assumption among researchers (Pinker, 1989) is that the child can infer 
semantic interpretations from linguistic context. Therefore the problem of learning 
interpretations from linguistic input can be framed as a problem of induction from pairs of 
linguistic and semantic representations. One can then show that, given sufficient pairs, the ideal 
learner is able to learn this mapping, in either direction, in a probabilistic sense. This result 
holds even though the mapping between linguistic and semantic representations can be many-
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to-many. That is, linguistic representations are often ambiguous; and the same meaning can 
often be expressed linguistically in a number of different ways. 
 Concretely, we view the learner’s problem as learning a relation between linguistic 
representations (e.g., as the i
th
 string of words), Si, and a semantic interpretations, Ij, 
(representing the j
th
 meaning of the string). Suppose that the language consists of a set of 
ordered pairs {<Si,Ij>}, which we sample randomly and independently according to 
computable probability distribution Pr(Si,Ij).  
Now we can apply the Prediction Theorem, as described above, but where the data now 
consist of pairs of sentences and interpretation, rather than strings of phonemes or words. So, 
when provided with a stream of sentence-interpretation pairs sampled from Pr(Si,Ij), the learner 
can, to some approximation, infer the joint distribution Pr(Si,Ij). But, of course, approximating 
this joint distribution is only possible if the learner can approximate the relationship between 
sentences Si and interpretations Ij.  
Writing the length of the shortest program that will generate the computable joint 
distribution, Pr(Si,Ij), as  K(Pr(Si,Ij)), the Prediction Theorem above ensures that this joint 
distribution is learnable from positive data by an ideal learner---if that positive data includes 
both form and meaning. Specifically, by (8), this has an expected sum-squared error bound of  
)),(Pr(
2
2log
ji
e ISK . Hence the expected value of error per data sample, will tend to zero because 
this bound is finite, but the data continues indefinitely.  
If ordered pairs of <Si,Ij> items can be predicted, then the relation between sentences 
and interpretations can be captured; and this implies that the mapping from sentences to 
probabilities of interpretations of those sentences, Pr(Ij| Si), and the mapping from 
interpretations to probabilities of sentences with those interpretations, Pr(Si|Ij), are learnable.
11
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Thus, we can conclude that the ideal learner is able to learn to map back and forth between 
sentences and their interpretations, given a sufficiently large supply of sentence-interpretation 
pairs as data. That is, in this specific setting at least, the relation between form and meaning 
can be derived from positive data alone.   
 
7. Scaling down simplicity: A practical method for assessing learnability 
We have described a range of rather abstract theoretical results concerning the viability of 
language learning by simplicity. But how far can the simplicity-based approach be “scaled-
down” to inspire concrete models of learning? The practical instantiation of the simplicity 
principle has been embodied using the minimum description length (MDL, Rissanen, 1987) 
and minimum message length (MML, Wallace & Freeman, 1987) frameworks. Simplicity has 
also widely been explored as general principle underpinning concrete models in a range of 
areas of perception and cognition (e.g., Attneave & Frost, 1969; Jacob Feldman, 2000; 
Hochberg & McAlister, 1953; Leeuwenberg, 1969), including language (e.g., Brent & 
Cartwright, 1996; Dowman, 2000; Ellison, 1992; Goldsmith, 2001; Onnis, Roberts & Chater, 
2002; Vousden, Ellefson, Solity & Chater, 2011; Wolff, 1988). Closely related Bayesian 
methods have also been widely employed (e.g., Kemp, Perfors & Tenenbaum, 2007; Langley 
& Stromsten, 2000; Perfors, Regier & Tenenbaum, 2006; Stolcke, 1994).  
The type of theoretical analysis that we have outlined above applies, by the invariance 
theorem, irrespective of specific choices of representations (as long as these are sufficiently 
powerful). But to make the approach computationally concrete requires choosing a specific 
representation—typically this will be a representational formalism developed in linguistics 
(e.g., some type of grammar). A code length can then be assigned both to the rules of the 
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grammar as well as to the corpus when encoded in terms of those rules (the corpus might 
consist of all the utterances that a learner has experienced so far, or a subset of these).   
Suppose that we wish to evaluate how much data is required to learn a particular 
linguistic regularity. This can be heuristically assessed by comparing two grammars which are 
identical aside from the fact that only one captures the regularity of interest. For example, 
consider how we might assess whether the corpus contains sufficient information to learn the 
restrictions on cases where is can be contracted that we described earlier. A grammar 
containing this additional regularity requires, of course, greater code-length than one that does 
not; but, on the other hand, because the resulting model of the language is more accurate, the 
code length of the corpus, given this more accurate model, will be shorter. Whether the 
‘balance’ favors the more complex but accurate grammar (thus allowing the restrictions on 
contraction to be learned) depends on the corpus. For a null, or a short, corpus, the advantage 
of a more accurate language model will not be sufficient; however, once the corpus becomes 
sufficiently long, the more accurate model will produce a shorter overall code-length, and the 
regularity will be learned. The question is: how long does the corpus need to be, for the 
regularity to learnable? 
  As discussed in Section 1, the simplicity principle automatically trades-off competing 
simpler and complex grammars. Simple, but over-general, grammars can be described more 
briefly, but because they are less accurate descriptions of actual language structure, they give 
an inefficient descriptions of language input. More complex grammars, which include 
linguistic restrictions, have more complex descriptions, but better capture the language and so 
give more efficient descriptions of the language input. By “investing” in a more complicated 
grammar, which contains a restriction on a construction, the language speaker obtains encoding 
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savings every time the construction occurs. Intuitively, a linguistic restriction is learned when 
the relevant linguistic context occurs often enough that the accumulated savings makes the 
more complicated grammar worthwhile, just as the extra cost of an energy saving appliance is 
justified if it is used sufficiently often. 
Recently, a simple and practical framework for assessing learnability of a wide variety 
of linguistic constructions under simplicity has been proposed (Hsu and Chater, 2010). Using 
natural-language corpora to simulate the language input available to the learner, this framework 
quantifies learnability (e.g., in estimated number of years of linguistic exposure) for any given 
linguistic constraint, such as the contraction of is mentioned earlier.   
To get started, we need some description of the grammatical rule to be learned, i.e., a 
description of an original, incorrect (over-general) grammar and the new, correct grammar, 
which contains the restriction rule. Moreover, we need a corpus which will serve as a proxy for 
the learner’s input. Given these, the framework provides a method for quantifying an upper 
bound on learnability from language input. This framework assumes an ideal statistical learner 
and thus provides an upper bound on learnability based on language statistics. However, 
measures of learnability should give an indication of the ease with which various linguistic 
constraints can be learned.  
While the details of implementing this framework are described elsewhere (Hsu & 
Chater, 2010; Hsu, Chater & Vitányi, 2011), an intuitive description of how this framework 
works is as follows: Under this framework, the learnability is affected by three factors. (1) The 
first is the complexity of the rule to be learned (greater complexity will decreases learnability). 
(2) The second concerns with what probability the “disallowed forms” would otherwise be 
expected to appear in place of other similar constructions which do occur (e.g., how often do 
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non-contracted forms “he is,” “she is” etc., and in which syntactic contexts).  (3) How 
frequently does the putative regularity apply in real language input. (1) and (2) determine how 
many occurrences of contexts where the regularity applies are needed for learning and (3) then 
will determine how many millions of words (or years of language input) are required to accrue 
the number of occurrences needed. These assumptions are all, of course, provisional; and hence 
results from this approach are suggestive rather than definitive.  
Hsu and Chater (2010) applied this general framework to consider the learnability of 
various linguistic restrictions, many of which have been viewed as presenting fundamental 
learnability challenges. They assuming that a learner’s input can be approximated using 
corpora of adult speech and writing, such as the Corpus of Contemporary American English 
(COCA). They found that the number of years of linguistic input required to learn putatively 
“unlearnable” constructions varied surprisingly widely, from a matter of months to more than a 
lifetime.  
Might these learnability differences across different linguistic restrictions correlate with 
how well people actually do learn them? This was tested in an experiment on adult native 
English speakers in Hsu, Chater and Vitányi (2011). Figure 1a shows the predictions for 15 
constructions from Hsu and Chater (2010), sorted in descending learnability. Figure 1b shows 
how often the constructions occur per year of linguistic input, estimated from COCA. Note that 
the occurrence rates do not monotonically decrease with the years required to learn the 
construction, because other factors that affect learnability, e.g., (1) and 2) listed above). 
Interestingly, the more learnable the constraints according to the simplicity analysis, the better 
they are learned in practice by native speakers: as log(1/predicted years needed) increased, the 
difference in the grammatical acceptability of the grammatical vs. ungrammatical form of the 
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construction also increased. Thus, a simplicity-based approach to language acquisition can 
provide not only general learnability results, but concrete predictions concerning how people 
learn language.  
 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have reviewed some recent results concerning learning language from 
experience by employing the simplicity principle: that is, favouring models of the language to 
the degree that they provide a short encoding of the linguistic input. We have shown theoretical 
results that indicate that an “ideal learner” implementing the simplicity principle can learn to 
predict language from experience; to determine which sentences of a language are grammatical 
to an arbitrarily good approximation (assuming, somewhat unrealistically, that the corpus of 
linguistic experience is noise-free, i.e., containing only grammatical sentences); to produce 
language; and to map between sentences and their interpretations. This “ideal” learning 
approach is valuable for determining what information is contained in a corpus. Yet it cannot 
be implemented computationally, as the relevant calculations are known to be uncomputable 
(Li & Vitányi, 1997). Nonetheless, we have also shown how a local approximation to such 
calculations can be used to choose between different grammars which do or do not contain 
specific regularities (especially those concerned with exceptions) that have been viewed as 
posing particular problems for theories of language acquisition. Overall, these results form part 
of a wider tradition of analytic and computational results on language learning which suggest 
that general a priori arguments about whether language acquisition requires language-specific 
innate constraints can be replaced by a more precise formal and empirical analysis.  
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Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1: Learnability predictions and experimental evidence: These results are re-plotted from 
Hsu, Chater & Vitányi (2011). (a) Estimated years required to learn construction. (b) Number 
of occurrences per year (estimated from COCA). (c) Relative grammaticality vs. learnability 
for Sentence Set 1 (r = 0.67;p = 0.006). Relative grammaticality judgments were elicited from 
200 native English speakers in an online study. Learnability is log of the inverse of the number 
of estimated years needed to learn the construction.  
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Footnotes  
1. Language acquisition involves dealing with other challenges, including the computational 
complexity of searching the space of grammars (Clark & Lappin, 2013), but these are outside 
our scope here.  
2. Typical speech is, of course, full of grammatical errors, repetitions, and incomplete 
utterances. Along with most other learnability analyses, we will ignore the “noisy” character of 
linguistic input.  
3. All code lengths are assumed, by convention, to be written in a binary alphabet.  
4. This approach implicitly assumes, among other things, no sequential dependencies between 
sentences, but generalizations are relatively straightforward.  
5. Recovery from overgeneralization can be explored in a number of frameworks, for example, 
Carlucci and Case (2013). 
6. Informally, we can view this process as embodying a Turing machine (or any other 
computer) combined with a source of randomness (i.e., a sequence of coin flips). The source of 
randomness captures the possibility that the process of generating the linguistic input may be 
non-deterministic (although it need not be); the restriction to computable probability 
distributions requires that the structure in the linguistic input is computable.  
7. Strictly,  is a measure, rather than a probability distribution, as the sequence is infinite; 
indeed, it is actually a semi-measure. Measures and semi-measures are generalizations of the 
standard notion of probability distributions. We ignore these technicalities here (see Chater & 
Vitányi, 2007; and Li & Vitányi, 1997). 
8. Note, though, that people presumably will share a mental representation language. Hence, 
the representational language used to formulate hypotheses in learning language will 
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presumably automatically be ideally suited to the natural languages that have been learned and 
generated by past generations of speakers (see, e.g., Christiansen & Chater, 2010). 
9. We have discussed how (probabilistic) generative grammars and computer programs 
generate linguistic data. The relation between these can be very close: in some formalisms 
(e.g., Definite Clause Grammars, Pereira & Warren, 1980), the program generating from the 
grammar is just a specification of the grammar itself.
 
 In general, the picture is slightly more 
complex, but we do not consider this further here.  
10. Technically it is important that this computer is monotone (Chater & Vitányi, 2007), but we 
shall ignore this complication. 
11. Of course, if interpretation, Ij, is such that Pr(Ij)=0, then the fact that Pr(Ij, Si) can be 
approximated arbitrarily well says nothing about Pr(Si|Ij); similarly for sentences, Si, such that 
Pr(Si)=0. But the learner presumably needs only learn sentences that express meanings that 
might actually arise; and interpret sentences that might actually be said, so this restriction is 
fairly mild. 
